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PRIVATE ORDERING UNDER THREAT OF REGULATION
Jake Linford
INTRODUCTION

In 2011, intellectual property (IP) owners lobbied for new laws that
would have required internet firms to more proactively prevent
infringement by foreign actors. These changes, embodied in a pair of
federal bills, the Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA) and PROTECT IPAct
(PIPA),1 would have required U.S.-based payment processors to take
reasonable or technically feasible measures to prevent transactions
between U.S. customers and the targeted domain name, whether or not
that domain name was hosted in the U.S. or abroad.2
Given Congress' general receptivity to pro-IP lobbying,3 IP owners
might reasonably have expected the passage of SOPA and PIPA, even
though advocates argued that the proposed scheme threatened to "break
the internet.", 4 It has long been conventional wisdom that copyright
owners can turn to Congress for nearly automatic passage of laws that
provide broad rights against infringers,5 backed with high damages.6
* Assistant Professor of Law, Florida State University. My thanks to Derek Bambauer,
Shawn Bayern, and David Levine for helpful feedback on this response.
1. Protect Intellectual Property Act (PIPA), S.968, 112th Cong. (2011); Stop Online
Piracy Act (SOPA), H.R. 3261, 112th Cong. (2011); Jake Linford, The InstitutionalProgress
Clause, 16 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L., 533, 580-82 (2014) [hereinafter Linford, Progress
Clause].
2. See, e.g., Annemarie Bridy, Copyright Policymaking as Procedural Democratic
Process:A Discourse-TheoreticPerspective on ACTA, SOPA, and PIPA, 30 CARDOZO ARTS &

ENT. L.J. 153, 154 (2012) [hereinafter Bridy, Policymaking].
3. For example, Congress recently passed, and President Barack Obama signed into law,
the Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-153, 130 Stat. 376 (codified as amended
at 18 U.S.C. § 1836 (2012)). The DTSA was enacted as an ostensible tool to fight
cyberespionage, even though academics warned that it was unlikely to meet that goal and highly
likely to have other negative consequences. See Professors' Letter in Opposition to the Defend
Trade Secrets Act of 2015 (S.1890, H.R. 3326) (Nov. 17, 2015); see also David S. Levine,
School Boy's Tricks: Reasonable Cybersecurity and the Panic of Law Creation, 72 WASH. &

LEE L. REV. ONLINE 323, 326 (2015) (arguing the DTSA is underinclusive because it fails to
directly address cyberespionage, and overinclusive because it would change trade secret
doctrine to sanction the acquisition of trade secrets through what were formerly legal means).
4. Mark Lemley, David S. Levine & David G. Post, Don't Break the Internet, 64 STAN.

L. REV. ONLINE 34, 38 (2011). SOPA, for example, would have required domain name system
authorities to prevent U.S. subscribers from viewing infringing sites by preventing domain
names from resolving to the assigned Internet Protocol (IP) address. See H.R. 3261 §
102(c)(2)(A)(i).
5. See Jessica D. Litman, Copyright, Compromise, and Legislative History, 72 CORNELL
L. REv. 857, 885 (1987); see also JESSICAD. LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 14 (2001) (describing

how Congress, between 1990 and 1999, "added more than one hundred pages to the copyright
statute, almost all of them billed as loophole-closers.").
6. Pamela Samuelson & Tara Wheatland, Statutory Damages in Copyright Law: A
Remedy in Need of Reform, 51 WM. & MARY L. REv. 439, 441 (2009).
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However, in early 2012, support for SOPA and PIPA dissipated after
millions of citizens, encouraged by Google, Wikipedia, and other
internet heavyweights, petitioned their elected officials to oppose the
bills.7 After the demise of SOPA and PIPA, one might have reasonably
concluded that direct intervention by Congress against internet vendors
and intermediaries could be on its way out.
In Internet Payment Blockades,8 Professor Annemarie Bridy
explains that the battle instead shifted to a new front. Instead of
Congress passing laws to regulate payment intermediaries directly,
Professor Bridy describes how administrators in charge of IP policy
have successfully pressured payment intermediaries to "voluntarily"
shut off payments to websites that are loci of copyright or other
intellectual property infringement. 9 As Professor Bridy recounts, the
White House Office of the Intellectual Property Enforcement
Coordinator (IPEC) persuaded payment processors (including American
Express, Discover, MasterCard, PayPal, and Visa) 1° to enter an
ostensibly voluntary best practices agreement with corporate intellectual
property owners." In accordance with the best practices agreement, IP
owners provide notice of infringing sales by online merchants, as well
as evidence that the IP owner owns the copyright or trademark 1in2
question and has notified the website operator of the infringement.
Payment processors agree to demand that vendors stop selling
infringing goods,1 3 and terminate relationships with
vendors that
"persist in intentionally selling Illegitimate Products."1 4
These agreements are ostensibly private agreements between
payment processors and IP Owners.'
As a result, government
intervention isn't direct. Unfortunately, that also means many details
about these agreements are not publicly available, and not subject to
mandated disclosure through mechanisms like Freedom of Information

7. See Bridy, Policymaking, supra note 2, at 159.
8. Annemarie Bridy, Internet Payment Blockades, 67 FLA. L. REv. 1523

(2015)

[hereinafter Bridy, Blockades].
9. Bridy, Blockades, supra note 8, at 1524-25.
10. U.S. INTELLECTUAL PROP. ENF'T COORDINATOR, ANNUAL REPORT ON INTELLECTUAL

PROPERTY
ENFORCEMENT
1
(2012)
[hereinafter
2011
IPEC
REP.],
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/PEC/ipec-annual report mar2012.pdf
(reporting on the adoption of best practices agreements by payment systems and Internet service
providers).
11. See Bridy, Blockades, supra note 8, at 1527.
12. See Best Practices to Address Copyright Infringement and the Sale of Counterfeit
Products on the Internet at para. 3(c-d) (May 16, 2011) [hereinafter Best Practices Agreement].
13. See id. para. 7; see also Bridy, Blockades, supra note 8, at 1551.
14. Best Practices Agreement, supra note 12, at para. 8; see also Bridy, Blockades, supra
note 8, at 1551.
15. Best Practices Agreement, supra note 12, at para. 4.
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Act requests. 16
Professor Bridy argues that adoption of the best practices agreement
was effectively coerced by an unscrupulous threat to regulate if
payment processors didn't sign on. 17 IPEC has a platform for suggesting
new copyright and trademark laws to Congress each year. 18 Displeasing
IPEC might therefore lead to a legislative response. Even worse, when
the decision to terminate a vendor occurs outside of litigation, governed
by terms that are not publicly accessible, accused infringers may not
receive fair process. Vendors who are deemed infringers may find
themselves unable to do business. Finding a new payment processor
may be difficult, especially if most processors have signed on to the best
practices agreement. But Professor Bridy finds hope that transactions
using Bitcoin and other decentralized currencies might allow threatened
online vendors to circumvent the payment blockades raised when
payment processors sign on to the best practices agreement. 19
Professor Bridy's analysis is mostly persuasive. In particular, her
advice to beware administrators threatening regulation is well-taken.
But there is some room for optimism, even when facing cajoled
payment processors. Private ordering can be more efficient than
government regulation, 20 even when it is encouraged externally rather
than intrinsically inspired. For example, the negotiated agreement
requires IP owners to take some reasonable steps in establishing IP
rights, and requires fact finding by the payment processor or its
intermediary, before sanctioning an allegedly infringing vendor.21
In addition, there are reasons to doubt that Bitcoin or similar
cryptocurrencies will break payment blockades. Widespread adoption of
Bitcoin or other cryptocurrencies may not happen. Bitcoin suffers from
high complexity compared to standard currencies. It is also perceived as
a technology optimized or primarily used for illicit transactions. In
addition, the technology may process transactions without
16. See Bridy, Blockades, supra note 8, at 1547; see also David S. Levine, Secrecy and
Unaccountability: Trade Secrets in Our Public Infrastructure, 59 FLA. L. REV. 135, 159-60

(2007) (describing how the Freedom of Information Act empowers citizens to request
government-held information).
17. See Bridy, Blockades, supra note 8, at 1528.
18. 15 U.S.C. § 8111(b)(1)(F) (2012).
19. See Bridy, Blockades, supra note 8, at 1562.
20. See John McMillan & Christopher Woodruff, Private Order Under Dysfunctional
Public Order, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2421, 2454 (2000) ("Private order therefore promotes economic

efficiency by giving businesspeople the confidence to transact."); Charles J. Walsh & Alissa
Pyrich, Rationalizing the Regulation of PrescriptionDrugs and Medical Devices: Perspectives
on Private Certification and Tort Reform, 48 RUTGERS L. REV. 883, 889 (1996) (suggesting a

plan to delegate some of the FDA's regulatory authority to private bodies in order to
increase efficiency). See generally Irina D. Manta, Privatizing Trademarks, 51 ARLz. L. REV.

381 (2009) (proposing privatized trademark registration as a means of improving efficiency).
21. Best Practices Agreement, supra note 12, at paras. 4, 6.
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intermediaries, but it has not yet mastered a way to prevent fraud.
I. JAWBONING AND PRIVATE ORDERING

Professor Bridy's article lays bare "the ease with which the
government can convince powerful corporate actors to do its bidding
when behind-the scenes pressure is brought to bear., 22 The process is
known by different names: Proxy censorship,23 soft censorship, "newschool" speech regulation, or "jawboning," where state actors seek to
coerce a company "based on threatened action at the edges of or wholly
outside their legal authority. 26 Jawboning is problematic because the
outcome of threatened legal action may be uncertain, and the costs of
the uncertainty are born by the target of the jawboning.27
A. Payment ProcessorsLack Incentives to ProtectCustomers
Jawboning may be particularly problematic when applied to internet
intermediaries that provide access to expressive content. An
intermediary may lack the incentive to protect third party content, and
may concede to demands in cases where society might benefit if it did
not yield. 28 Thus, when a state actor brings pressure, the cajoled party
may act in its own self-interest with little concern for the needs of those
whose speech or privacy could be restricted as a result of its decision.
Professor Bridy finds IPEC's jawboning of payment processors
unprincipled in part because the threatened action may overreach the
current contours of secondary liability in copyright and trademark law.
As Professor Bridy explains, in 2007, the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit undertook an exhaustive examination of secondaiy
liability in Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa InternationalService, Association.
In that case, the majority held, over a vigorous dissent by Judge Alex
Kozinski, that Visa was neither contributorily nor vicariously liable for
the infringement carried out by websites that used Visa to process
payments.] After the Supreme Court denied Perfect 10's petition for

22. Bridy, Blockades, supra note 8, at 1526.
23. See Seth F. Kreimer, Censorship by Proxy: The First Amendment, Internet
Intermediaries,and the Problem of the Weakest Link, 155 U. PA. L. REv. 11, 14 (2006).
24. See Derek E. Bambauer, Orwell's Armchair, 79 U. CHI. L. REv. 863, 870 (2012).
25. See Jack M. Balkin, Old-School/New-School Speech Regulation, 127 HARV. L. REV.
2296, 2298 (2014).
26. Derek E. Bambauer, Against Jawboning, 100 MINN. L. REv. 51, 55 (2015) [hereinafter
Bambauer, Against Jawboning].
27. See id. at 56.
28. See id. at 60.
29. See Bridy, Blockades, supra note 8, at 1535; Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa Int'l Serv. Ass'n,
494 F.3d 788 (9th Cir. 2007).
30. See Bridy, Blockades, supra note 8, at 1529-30, 38.
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certiorari," IP 3owners
shifted away from litigation and pursued
2
legislative relief.
Considering the case law, one might construe communication from
IPEC to "threaten[] action at the edges of... [its] legal authority., 33 But
we can better understand the strengths and limits of Professor Bridy's
critique of IPEC's influence on payment processors by comparing that
process to another recent example of soft coercion. In Backpage.com,
LLC v. Dart,34 the Seventh Circuit held that Thomas Dart, the Sheriff of
Cook County, Illinois, exercised unconstitutional prior restraint on the
speech of Backpage.com (Backpage) and its customers when he sent
letters to Visa and MasterCard asking the companies not to process
payments for the website, in light of what Dart insinuated was the
companies' potential legal liability for ads for illegal services. 35
Backpage is an online forum for classified ads. Backpage hosts ads
for adult services, and Sheriff Dart suspected some of those ads offered
illegal sex-related products or services like prostitution.3 6 After
receiving threatening letters from the sheriff, both Visa and MasterCard
cut ties with Backpage. 37 The website sued Sheriff Dart for imposing
informal prior restraint in violation of the First Amendment. 38 The court
noted that the sheriff s goal was apparently to shut down Backpage "by
suffocation, depriving the company of ad revenues by scaring off its
payments-service providers," without concern for whether the pressure
prevented legitimate as well as illegal offerings. 39 Sending the letters as
31. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa Int'l Serv. Ass'n, 553 U.S. 1079 (2008) (denying petition for

certiorari).
32. See Bridy, Blockades, supra note 8, at 1540.
33. Bambauer, Against Jawboning, supra note 26, at 55.
34. 807 F.3d 229 (7th Cir. 2015).

35. Dart cited to the federal money laundering statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1956, as a basis for
possible payment processor liability. See 807 F.3d at 232. Backpage may actually be insulated
from some liability for sex trafficking even if it allows advertisers to solicit customers using its
website under the Communications Decency Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1). See Dart v.
Craigslist, Inc., 655 F. Supp. 2d 961, 965-69 (N.D. Ill. 2009) (rejecting Dart's attempt to

sanction Craigslist for similar advertisements because under the CDA, " [n]o provider or user of
an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information
provided by another information content provider"). But see 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(1) ("Nothing in

this section shall be construed to impair the enforcement of section 223 or 231 of this title,
chapter 71 (relating to obscenity) or 110 (relating to sexual exploitation of children) of Title 18,
or any other Federal criminal statute."). If Backpage is insulated from liability, the same would
hold true for Visa and MasterCard. There can be no secondary liability without direct liability.
36. 807 F.3d at 230.
37. See id.
38. See id.

39. Id. at 231. Professor Bridy raises a similar example: Shortly after the Pentagon
objected to the publication of leaked military and diplomatic documents by Julian Assange and
Wikileaks, multiple payment processors including PayPal, Visa, and MasterCard stopped
processing donations for Wikileaks. See Bridy, Blockades, supra note 8, at 1524-25. As Bridy
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sheriff (rather than as a concerned, private citizen) was therefore an
informal prior restraint, the use of coercive state power in a manner
prohibited by the First Amendment.40
The Backpage case is somewhat analogous to the jawboning that
drove the payment processors to the best practices agreement. In both
situations, a state actor invites or coerces cooperation through
threatened legal action. The sheriff s demand letters warned of potential
dire consequences if payment processors continue to allow "suspected
illegal transactions to . . .take place. 41 IPEC's conversations with
payment processors in the shadow of potential legislative action led the
processors to accept the responsibility to terminate relationships with
repeat infringers.
Both cases also raise First Amendment implications. The Supreme
Court has held that informal sanctions designed to suppress speech are
unconstitutional. In Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan,4 2 the Court held that
a state commission violated the First Amendment by sending
threatening letters to a distributor of books the commission found
obscene, even though the attempted censorship was informal.43 Like the
books in Bantam Books, the advertisements at issue in Backpage are
close to core protected speech-and becoming closer, as the boundaries
between commercial speech and other types of speech erode under the
continued pressure of judicial review.
The Backpage case also differs from the decision of payment
processors to adopt best practices for dealing with infringement in a few
critical respects. First, the First Amendment implications are stronger in
recounts, "staffers for U.S. lawmakers directly pressured MasterCard and Visa" to block
payments to Wikileaks. Id. at 1525. Assange claimed that Wikileaks suffered a 95% drop in
revenue as a result of the blockade. Id.
40. 807 F.3d at 231 ("But [Dart] is using the power of his office to threaten legal
sanctions against the credit-card companies for facilitating future speech, and by doing so he is
violating the First Amendment unless there is no constitutionally protected speech in the ads on
Backpage's website ....
41. Id. at 232.
42. 372 U.S. 58 (1963).
43. See id. at 64-72.
44. Compare Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 563-66 (2011) (applying
heightened scrutiny and striking down regulation that barred the sale of doctors' prescribing
information to pharmaceutical detailers), with Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of
P.R., 478 U.S. 328, 340 (1986) (citing Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v.Pub. Serv. Comm'n
of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 561 (1980)) (holding "commercial speech receives a limited form of
First Amendment protection"); see also Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 364 (1977) (a
"consumer's concern for the free flow of commercial speech often may be far keener than his
concern for urgent political dialogue"); Linford, Progress Clause, supra note 1, at 542; Jane R.
Bambauer & Derek E. Bambauer, Information Libertarianism,105 CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming
2017) (recognizing the trend and arguing that it is beneficial because "when the state censors
communication, the results are often counterproductive.").
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the Backpage case than in the context of the best practices agreement.
Current Supreme Court jurisprudence at the intersection of the First
Amendment and copyright and trademark regimes suggests that courts
are not likely to find First Amendment implications when the sales of
counterfeit goods are blocked. The Court notes, for example, that "some
restriction on expression is the inherent and intended effect of eve 7
grant of copyright."45 The same can be said of trademark protection.
Nevertheless, the Court has held repeatedly that First Amendment
concerns in copyright law can be sufficiently protected by regimespecific mechanisms, like the idea/expression doctrine or fair use. The
Court has therefore been unwilling to apply heightened First
Amendment review of the federal copyright regimes. 48 But the Court
has applied intermediate scrutiny to a provision that extended
trademark-like rights in the term OLYMPIC to the United States
Olympic Committee.4 9
Congress may lack the political capital to pass direct regulation that
mirrors the obligations payment processors accepted under the best
practices agreement. If such regulation were enacted, however, it would
likely pass constitutional muster.50 If jawboning is problematic when
45. Golanv. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 876 (2012).
46. See Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 998 (2d Cir. 1989) (holding "[t]hough First
Amendment concerns do not insulate titles of artistic works from all Lanham Act claims, such
concerns must nonetheless inform our consideration of the scope of the Act as applied to claims
involving such titles"); Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 924 F. Supp. 1559,
1571 (S.D. Cal. 1996), aff'd, 109 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir. 1997) (discussing potential First
Amendment defenses to trademark liability).
47. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003) (the idea/expression dichotomy and
the fair use defense are "traditional contours" of copyright protection); Harper & Row,
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 560 (1985) (First Amendment protections are
"embodied in the Copyright Act's distinction between copyrightable expression and
uncopyrightable facts and ideas," and in the "latitude for scholarship and comment" safeguarded
by the fair use defense).
48. See, e.g., 132 S. Ct. at 890-91 (rejecting Progress Clause and First Amendment
challenges to a provision restoring protection to certain foreign-authored works); 537 U.S. at
219-20 (rejecting Progress Clause and First Amendment challenges to the Copyright Term
Extension Act, which extended the copyright term for twenty years).
49. See San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. USOC, 483 U.S. 522, 537 (1987) (holding
that the Amateur Sports Act of 1978, which prohibited certain commercial and promotional uses
of the term "Olympic," was not broader than necessary to protect a legitimate congressional
interest and thus did not violate the First Amendment, even though the rights at issue were
broader than standard trademark rights); see also Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 16, 17 (1979)
(holding that regulation to prevent the deceptive or misleading use of trade names did not
violate the First Amendment). In the October 2016 term, the Court will decide whether the
disparagement provision of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1052(a), which refuses registration to
disparaging marks, is facially invalid. See Lee v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 30 (2016) (granting writ of
certiorari).
50. But see Alfred C. Yen, Internet Service Provider Liabilityfor Subscriber Copyright
InJringement, Enterprise Liability, and the First Amendment, 88 GEO. L.J. 1833, 1888-89
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the state actor pressures behavior at the outer bounds, or even beyond
legal boundaries,51 then pressuring payment processors to discourage
infringement and cut off repeat infringers may not be problematic. But a
hypothetical regulation that would sanction payment processors for
handling payments for any advertisements on Backpage.com regardless
of the content of the advertisement would run afoul of the First
Amendment.52 Jawboning that leads payment processors to abandon
Backpage full stop, irrespective of the legality of individual ads, is
jawboning at its most invidious.
Second, in response to the pressure of Sheriff Dart, Visa and
MasterCard stopped processing all payments for Backpage ads, whether
or not those advertisements solicited custom for illegal behavior.53 But
under the best practices agreement, payment processors have the
obligation to investigate (or direct an acquiring bank to investigate)
whether a vendor is engaging in copyright infringement.54 They accept
the obligation to act only if the information gathered persuades them
that the vendor is selling infringing goods and there is no "genuine
issue" regarding the lawfulness of the merchant's sale.55 As I will
discuss below, the process isn't perfect, but there is a process in place
that attempts to prevent chronic infringement without cutting off
payments for plausibly legitimate sales.
Third, threatening litigation when the law has been interpreted in a
way that makes the litigation specious is a particularly pernicious form
of jawboning. But IPEC's jawboning took a much different form. Its
ability to force action from payment processors depended on its success
in pushing legislation through Congress 6-a difficult task in a postSOPA/PIPA world. Note the nature of the threat, if it can truly be
considered a threat: IPEC effectively tells payment processors, "You do
what I want you to do, or I'll tell Congress they ought to pass a law that
makes you do what I want you to do." Conversely, Sheriff Dart raised
the possibility that by processing payments for Backpage, payment
processors will run afoul of current laws like a federal moneylaundering statute. 5,7 A sitting sheriff armed with police power and an
(2000) (discussing First Amendment implications of the notice-and-takedown framework of the
Digital Millennium Copyright Act, which requires internet service providers to takedown
infringing content upon request from the lIP owner).
51. See Bambauer,Against Jawboning, supra note 26, at 55-56.
52. See Backpage.com, LLC v.Dart, 807 F.3d 229, 230 (7th Cir. 2015).
53. See id. at 232, 236.

54. See Best Practices Agreement, supra note 12.
55. See id.
56. See Bridy, Blockades, supra note 8, at 1545 (arguing that because "IPEC makes
specific legislative recommendations in its annual [Joint Strategic Plan] ....
the shadow of
potential law hangs perennially over the private-sector conversations that it facilitates").
57. See 807 F.3d at 232.
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aggressive interpretation of illegal behavior may well cause more direct
and more immediate problems for payment processors than IPEC.
B. Payment ProcessorsLack Incentives to Police Customers
As discussed above, internet intermediaries and payment processors
may not be motivated by self-interest to protect the speech or privacy
interest of their customers. But the same is true of intellectual property
rights. Internet and payment intermediaries are not directly incentivized
to protect IP rights, especially in cases where failing to do so can be
lucrative.
Recent cases like Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster,5 8
show how money can be made by turning a blind eye to infringement
carried out by third parties, 59 or using that infringement as a mechanism
to drive advertising traffic. 60 As others have noted, payment processors
are a crucial link in the chain even if they are indirect contributors to
infringement-driven business models.61 And while secondary liability
for payment processors may be in question, 62 U.S. law clearly sanctions
the sales of counterfeit goods. 3
C. The Virtue of Private Ordering
Professor Bridy is right to worry that jawboning puts undisclosed
pressure on payment processors' private decisions.6 4 Indeed, the
exertion of pressure through jawboning strikes Professor Bridy as
somewhat unprincipled, if not unscrupulous. 65 But there may be some
hidden virtues in direct conversations between payment processors and
IP owners, rather than directly imposed statutory solutions. Private
ordering has its virtues. For instance, private ordering can be more
58. See 545 U.S. 913, 918-919 (2005).
59. See, e.g., Jake Linford, A Second Look at the Right of First Publication, 58 J.
COPYRIGHT Soc'Y U.S.A. 585, 642-43 (2011) [hereinafter Linford, First Publication]

(discussing the risk of unauthorized copying and distribution a copyright owner faces when
deciding whether to post her work online).
60. See, e.g., Jake Linford, Scarcity of Attention in a World Without Copyright (2016)

(draft on file with author).
61. See, e.g., Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa Int'l Serv., Ass'n, 494 F.3d 788, 811 (9th Cir. 2007)
(Kozinski, J., dissenting); cf Doug Lichtman & Eric Posner, Holding Internet Service Providers
Accountable, 14 SuP. CT.ECON. REV. 221, 222 (2006).
62. See supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text.
63. See, e.g., 4 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 25:10 (4th ed.

2016) ("If a product is a 'counterfeit,' consequences can include: criminal prosecution; ex parte
civil seizure; more onerous importation penalties; and increased civil monetary recoveries, such
as statutory damages.") (citations omitted).
64. See Bridy, Blockades, supra note 8, at 1545 ("In light of' the ability of IPEC to make

legislative recommendations to Congress, "voluntary agreements [are] a form of regulation by
arm-twisting.").
65. See id. at 1545-46.
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efficient than regulation in some contexts, even if that private ordering
occurs in the shadow of threatened regulation. Society and even vendors
may benefit when payment processors actively negotiate the scope of
best practices, and retain some discretion in how to implement the
agreement. It is true that uncertainty about IP liability may sometimes
cut against the merchant, especially considering the charge that IP
owners have a tendency, and the incentive, to overclaim. Ensuing risk
averse choices by payment processors may leave some vendors without
a payment intermediary. But it is equally problematic to presume that a
payment processor is obligated to deal with an entity whose behavior
may run afoul of U.S. copyright or trademark law, whether or not the
payment processor would be contributorily or vicariously liable for that
behavior. 6
If we assume that jawboning creates de facto regulation, direct
conversations between payment processors and IP owners provide an
opening for payment processors to shape the de facto regulation. One of
the difficulties of the public choice account of the creation of IP laws
generally is that not everyone can pay to play. Some stakeholders get
left out of the discussion. 7 Jawboning which leads to private ordering
affords each payment processor some discretion to decide how best to
implement the responsibility to investigate alleged infringement by
vendors, and what to do when they find it.
One could read Professor Bridy's article as a call to give preference
to litigation or lobbying to handle all potential disputes. But those are
not the only, or necessarily the fairest or most efficient means to resolve
these conflicts. In fact, parties are encouraged to find negotiated
resolutions to legal disputes where possible.68 If payment processors
find credible a threat by the government to regulate their industry, and
chose to preempt the regulation with private ordering, negotiation may
lead to better tailored responses. Each payment processor can choose to
implement the best practices as they see fit, and if they do not coalesce

66. See, e.g., Jason Mazzone, Copyfraud, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1026, 1026 (2006).
67. See David S. Levine, TransparencySoup: The ACTA Negotiating Process and "Black
Box" Lawmaking, 26 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 811, 812 (2011) (documenting efforts to keep secret

details about the recently negotiated Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement); Jessica D. Litman,
Copyright Legislation and Technological Change, 68

OR. L.

REv. 275,

299

(1989)

("Throughout the various conferences, interests that were absent from the bargaining table were
shortchanged in the compromises that emerged.").
68. See Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, A Tale of Three Markets: The Law and
Economics of PredatoryLending, 80 TEX. L. REv. 1255, 1353 (2002) ("Settlements offer the

flexibility to forge creative solutions that are tailored to the loans and the borrowers in
question."); see also, e.g., Robbie v. City of Miami, 469 So. 2d 1384 (Fla. 1985) ("[S]ettlements

are highly favored and will be enforced whenever possible.").
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around the same terms,69 the variance might well provide some vendors
with payment options that have different levels of tolerance for alleged
infringement.
One might reasonably suspect that a threat to pass something like
SOPA or PIPA that would directly reach payment processors is an
empty threat after the dramatic failure of those Acts. But the processors
themselves found the threat credible, or preferred to accept the
"invitation" to self-regulate to the opportunity to oppose the
legislation-a potentially costly process.7 Such a deal is not per se
unenforceable. Indeed, contract law is full of examples where one
party provides valuable consideration by forgoing an opportunity to sue
another party. Whether the consideration is valid does not turn on
whether the forbearing party could have successfully prosecuted its
case, but instead whether the claim of right was subjectively reasonable
and whether the party settling with the forbearing party believed it
received some value from the transaction. For example, in Military
College Co. v. Brooks,73 a father agreed to settle a claim by a boardinA
school for tuition after the school dismissed his son for misconduct.
The court held that the promise not to sue for tuition was valuable
consideration, even though there was some question as to whether the
son was wrongfully dismissed, and thus whether the settled claim was
valid.75
In addition, allowing providers of services some discretion in
69. Contra Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 391 (1960) (finding

unconscionable terms adopted by the "big three" U.S. automobile manufacturers that severely
limited warranties, in part because consumers could find no seller providing better terms).
70. Cf Linford, FirstPublication, supra note 59, at 654-55 (arguing that publishers and

authors would benefit from the ability to consider the varied security profiles of competing
online intermediaries when deciding how and whether to provide internet access to their
copyrighted expression).
71. See, e.g., Kreimer, supra note 23, at 27 (describing the danger of externalizing costs of

resisting regulation of otherwise governable conduct on to intermediaries subject to direct
regulation).
72. Note, however, that an agreement reached under duress is unenforceable. See, e.g.,
Austin Instrument, Inc. v. Loral Corp., 272 N.E.2d 533, 537 (N.Y. 1971); Mark Seidenfeld &
Murat C. Mungan, Duress As Rent-Seeking, 99 MINN. L. REV. 1423, 1426-27 (2015) (arguing

that deals negotiated through "wrongful economic threats" should be unenforceable to the extent
that the threats enable inefficient rent seeking).
73. 147 A. 488 (N.J. 1929).
74. See id. at 488-89.

75. Id. at 489 ("An agreement to pay money in compromise of a suit is valid, and that
regardless of the validity of the plaintiff's demand."); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 74(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (forbearance of a claim is valid consideration even if

the claim or defense is doubtful, if that doubt is due to uncertainty as to facts or law, or the
forbearing party believes the claim is valid). But see RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS §

76(b) (AM. LAW INST. 1932) (forbearance of an invalid is not valid consideration if the
forbearing party lacks an honest and reasonable belief in its possible validity).
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deciding with whom and how to deal is a well-established position in
U.S. contract law. It would be problematic to suggest that a payment
processor should be forced to continue processing payments for a
vendor that persisted in engaging in illegal activity. Parties can and
should be allowed to contract with one another in a manner that they see
fit.
Professor Bridy also expresses concern that the best practices
agreement threatens to make U.S. copyright and trademark law the
default for all online transactions.76 Professor Bridy highlights this
possibility with a dispute that predates the best practices agreement.
AllofMP3.com was a Russian website that sold mp3 downloads for a
fraction of the price charged by authorized U.S. sellers.77
AllofMP3.com was not compliant with U.S. law, but complied with
Russian law. 78 An industry group nevertheless convinced payment
processors to stop processing payments for the site. 79 The site shut
down after Russian law changed, but the example highlights the
potential extraterritorial reach of decisions by payment processors. If
U.S. payment processors are handling international transactions, then
"U.S. law [may] becom[e], de facto, the law governing every cardmediated transaction involving an accused online merchant, no matter
where the merchant and its customers are located." 80
Imagine, however, the counterfactual. If payment processors are not
persuaded to stop payments to AllofMP3.com, then Russian copyright
law becomes the default for online transactions, as U.S. consumers take
advantage of much lower prices than authorized U.S. sellers can offer.
Every default sets the terms under which subsequent transaction or
regulation must occur, 81 and every default imposes some costs on
subsequent transactions or regulations, unless transaction costs are

76. See Bridy, Blockades, supra note 8, at 1554-55 ("If there is a conflict of intellectual

property laws between the United States and a jurisdiction in which a targeted site is registered
and its operators and servers are located, the foreign operator of the targeted site and the site's
non-U.S. customers could become indirectly subject to U.S. law through the imposition of a
voluntary payment blockade.").
77. See id. at 1555-56.
78. See id. at 1556 (citing CourtAcquits AllOJp3.com Site Owner, CNN (Aug. 15, 2007,

10:46 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2007/TECH/biztech/08/15/russia.site.reut/index.html?eref=rss
tech (reporting on the Russian court's decision that the site's operator, Denis Kvasov, was not
liable for copyright infringement because he paid a portion of the site's revenue to "ROMS, a
Russian organization which collects and distributes royalties for copyright holders")).
79. See id. at 1557.
80. Id. at 1558.
81. See Cass R. Sunstein, Empirically Informed Regulation, 78 U. CHI. L. REv. 1349,
1392 (2011) (citing Eric J. Johnson et al., Framing, Probability Distortions, and Insurance
Decisions,7 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 35, 48-50 (1993)).
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zero. 82 Indeed, sometimes defaults are particularly sticky because many
people will not choose to opt out of the default. 83 If U.S. law isn't the
default, then Russian law becomes the default, with its norms of noninfringement and non-compensation for copyright owners.84
In reality, the voluntary action of payment processors provided a
more finely-tuned outcome than either of the default positions described
above. For example, as Professor Bridy reports, payment processors like
MasterCard block transactions between foreign sellers and customers in
the U.S. if the transaction violates U.S. law. But payment processors
do not block transactions between foreign sellers and foreign customers
if the transaction is legal in their respective jurisdictions. 86 The
voluntary regime effectively separates provision of services to U.S.
consumers that would be infringing under U.S. law from sales to foreign
consumers that would not be infringing under foreign law. As Professor
Bridy acknowledges, this quasi-private ordering provides a better
outcome than SOPA and PIPA, the legislation brought forward in
Congress to deal with the perceived problem of extraterritorial
infringement.87
Professor Bridy has also recognized the virtue of private ordering in
the context of peer-to-peer infringement. 88 The Digital Millennium
Copyright Act ("DMCA") 89 grants online service providers immunity
from secondary liability for copyright infringement by their customers,
if they take down on notice from copyright owners infringing content
stored on the service provider's network at the direction of users. 90 But
the takedown requirement doesn't reach infringement that is shared
peer-to-peer, because the infringing material isn't stored anywhere that
the service provider can reach it. 9 Content owners brought John Doe
suits, sometimes against thousands of anonymous infringers, seeking to
acquire the identities of consumers. 92 Some courts responded by
82. See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An
Economic Theory of DefaultRules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 93 (1989).
83.

See RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT

HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 161-74 (2008).

84. See Bridy, Blockades, supra note 8, at 1556, 1559.
85. See id. at 1557.
86. See id. at 1558 (quoting Stop Online Piracy Act: Hearing Before the Comm. on the
Judiciary H.R. on H.R. 3261, 112th Cong. 96-98 (2011) (Appendix A to statement of Linda

Kirkpatrick, Group Head, Customer Performance Integrity, MasterCard Worldwide)).
87. See Bridy, Blockades, supra note 8, at 1559.
88. See Annemarie Bridy, Is Online Copyright Enforcement Scalable?, 13 VAND. J. ENT.
& TECH. L. 695, 727 (2011) [hereinafter Bridy, Scalability].
89. Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2877 (1998) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 512
(2012)).
90. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c).
91. See id. § 512(a)(4).
92. See Bridy, Scalability,supra note 88, at 720-22.
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severing defendants that had been improperly joined.9 3 Pleas for
Congress to amend the DMCA went unanswered, so service providers
like Verizon made deals with content owners like Disney, offering to
forward notices from Disney to Verizon customers. 94 Verizon was able
to process Disney's complaints without violating customer privacy by
disclosing customer identities. 95 As Professor Bridy notes, the direct
negotiation between IP owners and service providers "serve[d] the
interests of both privacy and efficiency. 96 Similar benefits can come
from encouraging direct negotiation between IP owners and payment
providers, even if an agency like IPEC helps open communication
channels. 97 It is also possible that private ordering opens space for
merchants to insert themselves into the negotiation. If a critical mass of
merchants take issue with how one payment processor implements the
best practices agreement, they can shift business to a different provider,
or discuss potential changes collectively."
Admittedly, one flaw of private ordering in crafting best practices
for payment processors is that infringing vendors do not have a voice at
the table. That would likely have been the case with regard to a
legislative response as well. 99 The potential dissatisfaction of vendors
with the best practices agreement might resemble the dissatisfaction of
consumers subject to new terms of service pursuant to a change of terms
clause. These terms are often adopted by credit card companies to
provide the card provider with maximum flexibility, and enforced by
courts over objections that they are unconscionable or otherwise
93.
94.
95.
96.

See id. at 723 (summarizing cases).
See Bridy, Scalability,supra note 88, at 726-27.
See id. at 726.
Id. at 727.

97. There are some who argue that IPEC is so firmly on the side of lIP owners that its role
in opening those channels is inherently problematic. Compare David Kravets, U.S. Copyright
Czar

Cozied

Up

to

Content Industry,

E-Mails Show,

WIRED,

Oct.

14,

2011,

https://www.wired.com/2011/10/copyright-czar-cozies-up/ (reporting that IPEC head Victoria
Espinel may have had a close relationship with content owners while IPEC brokered a private
six-strikes deal between IP owners and online service providers), and Bambauer, Against
Jawboning, supra note 26, at 77-78 (when IPEC was engaged with six-strikes negotiations,
"Vice President Joe Biden convened a copyright enforcement meeting that included law
enforcement, the IPEC, and content companies-but not ISPs"), with Mike Masnick, President
Obama Finally Gets Around to Nominating a New IP Czar, TECHDIRT, Aug. 29, 2014,
https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20140829/06225828360/president-obama-finally-gets-aroundto-nominating-new-ip-czar.shtml (noting that while the former head of IPEC, Victoria Espinel,
immediately took a lobbying job after leaving IPEC, she nevertheless "worked really hard to
take opposing viewpoints into account").
98. Cf Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Principlesof Relational Contracts, 67 VA. L.
REV. 1089, 1132 (1981) (describing how franchisees collectively negotiated to limit unilateral
termination in franchise contracts).
99. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
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problematic. 100
The decision to extend or deny credit has a significant effect on
consumers, but extending credit to the wrong consumers can have a
negative effect on card issuers.10 1 If credit card companies can decide
whether to extend credit,10 2 should the law prevent payment processors
from deciding whether to process payments for repeat infringers? The
assessment of risk-and the decision about whether to continue the
relationship-properly belongs with the payment processor. If the
processor can decide the procedure for ending a relationship with a
vendor, fair process may be a non-issue, unless the payment processor
breaches terms of its contract with a vendor.
Professor Bridy argues the systemic impact of allowing payment
processors to exercise this discretion threatens the internet ecosystem. 103
In assessing whether this discretion conveys problematic "existential
power [on] payment intermediaries," 10 4 we must consider whether the
best practices adopted by payment processors allow for unfair
termination of vendors, or provide them with sufficiently fair process.
II.

FAIR PROCESS UNDER THE BEST PRACTICES AGREEMENT?

Professor Bridy acknowledges that in a perfect world, private
agreements like the best practices agreements would raise no cause for
alarm.10 5 But mistakes are likely inevitable. Lowering error costs often
requires increasing enforcement costs. 106 Professor Bridy notes that
because the best practices are designed to make it easy to quickly
remove large amounts of infringing content, higher enforcement costs

100. See generally Jake Linford, UnilateralReordering in the Reel World, 88 WASH. L.
REV.1395, 1413-14 (2013) (describing cases considering the enforceability of change of terms
clauses).
101. See Adam J. Levitin, Rate-Jacking: Risk-Based & Opportunistic Pricing in Credit
Cards, 2011 UTAH L. REV. 339, 363 (2011) (discussing risk faced by credit card providers when
extending a line of credit).
102. The authority to deny credit is not without limits. For example, if an institution denies
credit based on information obtained from a consumer reporting agency, section 615 of the Fair
Credit Reporting Act requires the institution to send notice of the denial. 10-035 Duties of
Report Users, FIN. PRIV. L. GD. P 10-035 (CCH), 2015 WL 6372996 (2016).
103. See Bridy, Blockades, supra note 8, at 1525.
104. Id.
105. See Bridy, Blockades, supra note 8, at 1560-61.
106. See, e.g., Tun-Jen Chiang, The Rules and Standards of Patentable Subject Matter,
2010 Wis. L. REV. 1353, 1400 (2010) (citing Richard A. Posner, Employment Discrimination:
Age Discriminationand Sexual Harassment, 19 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 421, 423 (1999) ("Rules
have higher error costs but lower administrative costs; standards have lower error costs but
higher administrative costs. The relative size of the two types of cost will determine the efficient
choice between the alternative methods of regulation in particular settings.")); see also Robert
G. Bone, Enforcement Costs and TrademarkPuzzles, 90 VA. L. REv. 2099, 2124 (2004).
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should be required to lower potential error costs. 10 7 Other regimes
designed to deal with problems of internet infringement, like the notice
and takedown regime of the DMCA, or the Copyright Alert System, a
framework for internet service providers to warn-and eventually
sanction-customers who regularly engage in infringement, include
options for judicial review. log
It is unclear whether the best practices agreement for payment
processors provides that same option. The best practice agreement states
that payment processors "shall have a process in place to allow for
prompt review of remedial measures imposed" if a vendor or acquiring
bank "disputes the allegations of infringement." 109 My attempt to
acquire more detailed information from payment processors about the
contours of this "prompt review" was not successful.
While I was unable to secure information directly from any payment
processor about how they handle intellectual property disputes, some
payment processors have posted online a description of their process.
For example, according to a recent online publication, "Visa is
committed to preventing the use of its payment brand and system for
illegal transactions. 'Ho Visa's process includes directing an allegedly
infringing merchant to cease selling goods identified as infringing by an
IP owner, or terminating the merchant's account, if it receives evidence
of repeat infringement. 1
To initiate Visa's process, an IP owner must provide evidence of
prior enforcement efforts, demonstrating "the IP Owner's own good
faith attempts to enforce its IP rights."1 12 Visa specifically contemplates
that a cease-and-desist letter might indicate such a good faith attempt."'
Visa also requires proof that the complaining owner has valid rights,
including but not limited to trademark or copyright registration

107. See Joseph Scott Miller, Error Costs & IP Law, 2014 U. ILL. L. REv. 175, 182 (2014)

(" [Flalse positives (erroneous grants of an IP entitlement) are systematically costlier than false
negatives (erroneous denials of an IP entitlement).").
108. See Annemarie Bridy, GraduatedResponse American Style: "Six Strikes" Measured
Against Five Norms, 23 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1, 53-55 (2012)

(describing opportunities for neutral adjudication under the Copyright Alert System).
109. Best Practices Agreement, supra note 12, at para. 10.
110. Intellectual Property, VISA USA, usa.visa.com/legal/intellectual-property-rights.html
(last visited Jan. 7, 2017) [hereinafter Visa IP Policy] (click on "Report intellectual property
abuse" tab).
111. See id. (click on "Illegal transactions prohibited" tab).

112. Id. (click on "Evidence of Prior Enforcement Efforts" tab).
113. See id. Unfortunately, while sending a demand letter certainly provides evidence of an
attempt to enforce IP rights, it does not necessarily evidence the existence of enforceable rights.
See, e.g., Irina D. Manta, Bearing Down on Trademark Bullies, 22 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP.

MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 853, 854 (2012) (describing how trademark "bullies" send cease and desist
letters based on legal claims that are spurious or non-existent).
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certificates. 114 In addition, Visa also requires evidence that the allegedly
infringing goods can be purchased using a Visa card.1 15 Visa further
demands a signed attestation under penalty of perjury, but doesn't
specify to what the IP owner must attest. 116
Some of the requirements Visa imposes on IP owners are similar to
the steps required of copyright owners requesting takedown from an
online service provider pursuant to the DMCA. 117 The party requesting
takedown must assert, under penalty of perjury, that it represents a
legitimate IP owner. 118 The complaining party must identify the work or
works that are infringing with enough specificity for the service
provider to locate them. r 9 And the complaining party must assert a
good faith belief that the material to be taken down is not authorized by
the copyright owner, its agents, or the law. 120 At least one court has held
this good faith belief requires the complaining party to consider whether
12 1
the use of the work was fair use before sending a takedown notice.
These thresholds are not inconsequential. Courts have held that failure
to observe DMCA formalities invalidates a takedown request. 122
If the IP owner crosses these DMCA-style thresholds, Visa instructs
an "acquiring bank," the entity with a direct relationship to the accused
vendor, 123 to investigate allegations of IP infringement. 124 If the
acquiring bank concludes that the merchant is selling infringing goods
identified by the IP owner, and the merchant does not cease selling
those goods, the acquiring bank is expected to stop processing Visa

114. See Visa IP Policy, supra note 110 (click on "Evidence of IP Rights" tab)

115. See id. (click on "Acceptance of Visa cards at the Merchant website" tab).
116. See id. (click on "IP owner's attestation" tab).

117. That's not to say the DMCA's policies are ideal. In fact, they are frequently criticized.
See Jennifer M. Urban et al., Notice and Takedown in Everyday Practice, UC Berkeley Pub. L.

Res. Paper No. 2755628 (2016), http://ssm.com/abstract=2755628 (noting that the DMCA
works differently for different actors, and identifying flaws in its current operation); see also
Annemarie Bridy, Three Notice Failures in Copyright Law, 96 B.U. L. REV. 777, 783-790
(2016) (arguing that the DMCA's red flag knowledge standard under 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A)

fails to provide sufficient notice to online intermediaries). But it would not be surprising to see
similar policies required by direction legislative intervention.
118.
119.
120.
121.

See
See
See
See

17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A)(i, vi).
id. at § 512(c)(3)(A)(ii, iii).
id. at § 512(c)(3)(A)(v).
Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 815 F.3d 1145, 1153 (9th Cir. 2016) ("[B]ecause

17 U.S.C. § 107 created a type of non-infringing use, fair use is 'authorized by the law' and a
copyright holder must consider the existence of fair use before sending a takedown notification
under § 512(c).").
122. See, e.g., Hendricksonv. eBay Inc., 165 F. Supp. 2d 1082, 1089-90 (C.D. Cal. 2001).
123. Visa contracts with merchants through acquiring banks. See Bridy, Blockades, supra

note 8, at 1551.
124. Payment processors like American Express do not use acquiring banks as
intermediaries and must conduct their own inquiries. See id.
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payments for the merchant. 125 On the other hand, if the merchant or
acquiring bank provides evidence of a "genuine issue" regarding the
lawfulness of the merchant's sale of the identified goods, Visa opts out
of the conversation, passes the collected evidence on to the IP owner,
and encourages the IP owner to address its concerns directly to the
merchant or the acquiring bank. 126
Visa also reserves the right to require the IP owner to indemnify or
otherwise hold Visa harmless for attorneys' fees, costs, and damage
incurred in connection with the dispute. Visa's publicly available
explanation of its practices reserves the sole discretion to decide
whether the IP owner must "defend, indemnify, and hold Visa
harmless" against claims by the acquiring bank or the merchant
regarding action taken. 127 Visa also reserves sole discretion to determine
whether an IP owner must pay attorneys' fees, costs, and damages
incurred by Visa or the acquiring bank in connection with the dispute. 128
The indemnification clause superficially resembles a bond to secure
injunctive relief As in other federal cases, IP owners seeking injunctive
relief must post a bond to secure that relief 129 If regularly applied, the
indemnification clause should forestall some overclaiming by IP
130
owners.
But Visa's right to seek indemnification isn't exactly like a bond. In
litigation, a bond must be paid in an amount deemed sufficient by a
district court before a preliminary injunction will issue. 131 That amount
is set in part to compensate the enjoined party if the injunction was
improperly granted. 132 Visa's process is an ex post redistribution of
costs, rather than an ex ante determination about the potential harm of
an erroneously granted injunction. In addition, in litigation, a judge
determines whether the IP owner is entitled to injunctive relief,
weighing the burdens on the IP owner, the alleged infringer, and the
125. See Visa IP Policy, supra note 110.
126. See id.
127. Id. (click on "What if the Merchant defends its business?").
128. See id.
129. See FED. R. Civ. P. 65(c); Georgia Television Co. v. TV News Clips of Atlanta, Inc.,
718 F. Supp. 939, 950 (N.D. Ga. 1989) (noting in a copyright infringement dispute, that "Rule

65(c) requires the posting of security in the sum as the Court deems proper for the payment of
costs and damages as may be incurred or suffered by any party who is found to have been
wrongfully enjoined or restrained").
130. Cf Nintendo of Am., Inc. v. Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc., 16 F.3d 1032, 1037 (9th Cir.

1994) (allowing the wrongfully enjoined party to recover the injunction bond discourages
parties from "requesting injunctions based on tenuous legal grounds").
131. See Thomas Patterson, Litigation: The Bond Requirementfor PreliminaryInjunctions,
INSIDE COUNSEL (Sept. 5, 2013), http://www.insidecounsel.com/2013/09/05/litigation-the-bond-

requirement-for-preliminary-in.
132. qad. inc. v. ALN Assocs., Inc., 781 F. Supp. 561, 562 (N.D. Ill. 1992).
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public at large. 133 A process like Visa's instead leaves Visa and its
acquiring banks with the responsibility of determining whether a vendor
will lose its ability to process payments. There are no articulated
standards for how Visa should evaluate relative costs, merely a
statement that in cases with "genuine issues," it will opt out of the
discussion and leave the TP owner and vendor to discuss the
infringement directly. 134 The process outlined is imperfect, to be sure,
but the burdens of production on owners are not inconsequential. And
the imperfections do not justify stripping payment processors of the
ability to decide how and whether to transact with vendors, irrespective
of whether those decisions are made in the shadow of threatened
legislation.

III.

BREAKING BLOCKADES INTO BITS

Professor Bridy hopes that shifting transactions to Bitcoin or other
cryptocurrencies might provide online vendors like AllofMP3.com the
ability to reach consumers sans intermediation, which would insulate
them from the decisions of payment processors to implement
arrangements like the best practices agreement. 135 Bitcoin and other
cryptocurrencies reduce the costs of validating transactions and
mediating disputes as users contribute computer processing power to
validate transactions,136 ,creating a public record of the chain of custody
of each Bitcoin." 137 Satoshi Nakamoto, the programmer credited with

133. See, e.g., Voice of the Arab World, Inc. v. MDTV Med. News Now, Inc., 645 F.3d 26,
34 (lst Cir. 2011) ("[A] request to preliminarily enjoin alleged trademark infringement is
subject to traditional equitable principles."); Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68, 79-80 (2d Cir.
2010) ("[A district court must.., consider whether [the plaintiff] is likely to suffer irreparable
injury in the absence of an injunction.... balance the competing claims of injury, and.., pay
particular regard for the public consequences in employing the extraordinary remedy of
injunction.") (quoting Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 22-24 (2008) (internal
quotations omitted)).
134. See Visa IP Policy, supra note 110.
135. See Bridy, Blockades, supra note 8, at 1563 ("P2P virtual currencies eliminate the
need for third-party payment intermediaries to act as trusted authorities for processing and
verifying transactions between merchants and customers.") (citing P. CARL MULLAN, THE
DIGITAL CURRENCY CHALLENGE: SHAPING ONLINE PAYMENT SYSTEMS THROUGH U. S. FINANCIAL

REGULATIONS 86 (2014) ("Transactions on the Bitcoin network never need to circulate through a
traditional financial institution or bank.")).
136. See Shawn Bayern, Of Bitcoins, Independently Wealthy Software, and the ZeroMember LLC, 108 Nw. U. L. REv. 1485, 1487 (2014).
137. Derek A. Dion, I'll Gladly Trade You Two Bits on Tuesdayfor a Byte Today: Bitcoin,
Regulating Fraudin the E-Conomy of Hacker-Cash, 2013 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL'Y, 165, 167
(2013).
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developing Bitcoin, 138 apparently developed the system in a
decentralized fashion in part to insulate it against organized disruption
like direct government interference. 139 Bitcoin is decentralized in a way
that makes it difficult to find a central actor to coerce.
But it is not entirely clear that cryptocurrencies can cut out all need
for reliance on middlemen. Indeed, Professor Bridy' s solution may trade
reliance on one intermediary for another. People who deal exclusively
in Bitcoin need never exchange them for another currency, but many
owners of Bitcoin will seek to exchange them at some point. Bitcoin
exchanges convert Bitcoin to currencies like the U.S. Dollar at rates
determined by the exchange. 140 Those exchanges provide a potential
leverage point for regulatory activity or jawboning. Scholars have
already identified potential regulatory interventions that could slow
Bitcoin transactions. 141 IPEC or some other state actor could pressure an
exchange to stop processing transactions for repeat infringers in
exchange for not attempting regulatory intervention. Bitcoin exchanges
may pursue their rational self-interest just like payment processors.142
Exchanges might prefer to comply with soft coercion to avoid new
legislation or regulation, just as payment processors found it reasonable
to deal with IP owners rather than risk new legislation. Thus, vendors
will only be insulated from the potential effects of jawboning if they opt
entirely out of traditional payment systems. In addition, to the extent
that Bitcoin and other decentralized currencies are viewed as means to
illegal ends, they may be likely to attract regulatory attention.
Another limitation of cryptocurrencies is highlighted by the recent

138. See Bayern, supra note 136, at 1488. Nakamoto appears to be a pseudonym. See
Reuben Grinberg, Bitcoin: An Innovative Alternative Digital Currency, 4 HASTINGS SCI. &
TECH. L.J. 159, 162 (2012).

139. See Posting of Satoshi Nakamoto to cryptographygmetzdowd.com (Nov. 7, 2008),
http://www.mail-archive.com/cryptography#_metzdowd.com/msg09971.html
("Governments
are good at cutting off the heads of a centrally controlled network[ ] like Napster, but pure [peerto-peer] networks like Gnutella and Tor seem to be holding their own.").
140. See Notice of Filing of a Proposed Rule Change to BZX Rule 14.11(e)(4),
Commodity-Based Trust Shares, To List and Trade Winklevoss Bitcoin Shares Issued by the
Winklevoss Bitcoin Trust, 81 Fed. Reg. 45554 (proposed July 14, 2016). Bitcoin exchange rates
have fluctuated widely, compared to traditional currency pairs. See Eric Engle, Is Bitcoin Rat
Poison? Cryptocurrency, Crime, and Counterfeiting (CCC), 16 J. HIGH TECH. L. 340, 341 n.5
(2016); Trevor I. Kiviat, Note, Beyond Bitcoin: Issues in Regulating Blockchain Transactions,
65 DuKE L.J. 569, 584 (2015).

141. Indeed, many scholars have analyzed whether Bitcoin exchanges are susceptible to
regulation as financial institutions or securities traders. See, e.g., Dion, supra note 137, at 197.
142. Cf Bridy, Scalability,supra note 88, at 715-16 ("Forced to choose between protecting
themselves from liability and protecting the expressive rights of their users, service providers
[protected by the DMCA safe harbor] are much more likely to err on the side of caution.").
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143
dissolution of Mt. Gox, once the world's largest Bitcoin exchange:
Sometimes, the middlemen are not reliable. Mt. Gox announced
bankruptcy in 2014 after hackers apparently stole 850,000 Bitcoin
valued at $460 million.144 Consumers may hesitate to rely on a financial
system subject to exploits like the Mt. Gox attack.1 5 It's also not
entirely clear that Bitcoin is immune to tampering. 146 In addition,
Bitcoin is often used for illegal gambling, drug transactions, and
donations to criminal hacker groups. 147 Customers looking for a
legitimate experience and the security that comes with a major credit
card may go elsewhere. To the extent that this is true, Bitcoin and other
cryptocurrencies will provide limited utility for the average consumer,
and thus of limited benefit to vendors hoping to avoid U.S. copyright
and trademark law.
In fact, the use of Bitcoin or cryptocurrencies may well divide illicit
from authentic actors. If vendors looking to avoid copyright liability use
cryptocurrencies to avoid an uncomfortable conversation with online
intermediaries, the method of avoidance will significantly cut into
profits. Bitcoin's current level of adoption for example, is low
compared to the use of standard currencies, 1W but it may grow if the
14 9
system finds ways to simplify transactions for unsophisticated users,
and provide fraud protection that is currently hard to replicate without
trust intermediaries.

143. See Robert McMillan, The Inside Story of Mt. Gox, Bitcoin's $460 Million Disaster,

WIRED (Mar. 3, 2014), https://www.wired.com/2014/03/bitcoin-exchange/.
144. See id.

145. That's not to say that financial institutions that deal in standard currencies like the
dollar are immune to hacking, but mechanisms like the coverage provided by the Federal

Deposit Insurance Corporation backstop those institutions against loss. See Sarah Gruber, Note,
Trust, Identity, and Disclosure: Are Bitcoin Exchanges the Next Virtual Havens for Money
Laundering and Tax Evasion?, 32 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 135, 159-61 (2013) (explaining risks

inherent in the Bitcoin system).
146. See, e.g., Bayern, supra note 136, at 1490-91 (noting that while successful disruption

by a single party is unlikely, disputes in the blockchain are resolved in favor of transactions
backed by the most computing power, which leaves open the possibility that faster computers
and specialized hardware might theoretically provide some level of effective "voting" power).
147. See Dion, supra note 137, at 169.
148. See Bridy, Blockades, supra note 8, at 1566; Michael Jackson, Bitcoin's Big
Challenge in 2016: Reaching 100 Million Users, COiNDESK (Jan. 1, 2016),
http://www.coindesk.com/2016-bitcoin-challenge-100-million-users/
(reporting roughly 10
million Bitcoin wallets and roughly 200,000 Bitcoin transactions per day); How Many People
Really Own Bitcoin and Why Does it Matter?, BITSCAN
(Feb. 10, 2014),

http://bitscan.com/bitnews/item/how-many-people-really-own-bitcoins-and-why-does-it-matter
(as of late 2014, 31 million transactions had taken place throughout Bitcoin's history, and

roughly 250,000 addresses held more than a fractional amount of Bitcoin).
149. See Jackson, supra note 148.

PRIVATE ORDERING UNDER THREAT OF REGULATION

CONCLUSION

Professor Bridy's article highlights the political economy of
jawboning, the pressure it puts on payment processors to carry water for
TP owners, and the potential dangers jawboning poses for the continued
viability of the territorial boundaries of copyright and trademark law.
Turning to Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies will provide avenues for
vendors to service tech-savvy consumers unconcerned about Bitcoin's
reputation as an illicit currency and willing to overlook risk of fraud.
But that turn may not provide vendors with enough traffic to avoid
dealing with payment processors.
The decision of payment processors to implement the best practices
agreement may nevertheless provide vendors with some room to
maneuver, at least to the extent that payment processors have preserved
some discretion in implementing the agreement as they see fit, and so
long as they do not all adopt the same terms. The procedure provided by
payment processors is imperfectly disclosed. But given what we know,
they outline a valid attempt to ensure that complaining owners have
authentic rights, that alleged repeat infringers engage in chronic
infringement, and that there is no "genuine issue" regarding the
lawfulness of the merchant's sale of alleged infringing goods.

